Un monopole d'État : la prévision économique et sociale en France

In: Revue française d'administration publique, Band 9, Heft 1, S. 117-142

Abstract

A state monopoly : economic and social forecasting in France. Setting out on the often conflicting relations between administrators and researchers, the author underlines the antagonizing professional logics of research and administration. An analysis of the insertion of planning into the French administration shows up the conditions under which these conflicting requirements may be reconciled.
The main conclusion to be drawn from this study of the French forecasting machinery seems to be the factual monopoly enjoyed by the executive body for using the major forecasting agencies, none of which can explore in-depth the economic and social policy assumptions that would disagree with those of the ruling political elite. Concretely, the question is whether a larger accessibility of economic and social information will be brought about by developing agencies which are more independent from the executive or by increasing outside the State the number of competing forecasting bodies related to the big social movements.