Remedying Disregard in Global Regulatory Governance: Accountability, Participation, and Responsiveness
In: American journal of international law: AJIL, Band 108, Heft 2, S. 211-270
Abstract
A myriad of specialized and fragmented global regulatory bodies wield ever-increasing power and influence. In making decisions, these mission-oriented authorities tend systematically, due to deep-seated structural factors, to give greater regard to the interests and concerns of some actors, especially powerful states and well-organized economic actors, and lesser regard to the often peripheral interests and concerns of more weakly organized and less powerful groups and of vulnerable individuals. The overall pattern of global regulation reflects a similar bias. The most powerful global regulatory regimes promote the objectives of dominant states and economic actors, whereas regimes to protect weaker groups and individuals are often less effective or virtually nonexistent and are thus unable to protect their interests and concerns. As a result of these two types of disregard, the dominant actors in global regulatory governance enjoy disproportionate benefits from international cooperation, while weaker groups and individuals suffer deprivation and often serious harm.
Sprachen
Englisch
Verlag
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
ISSN: 2161-7953
DOI
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