Questioning the Assumptions of Moralism, Universalism, and Interpretive Dominance in Racist Monument Debates

In: Public affairs quarterly: PAQ ; philosophical studies of public policy issues, Band 36, Heft 3, S. 233-255

Abstract

Abstract
This essay questions three widespread assumptions in monument debates: "moralism," "universalism," and "interpretive dominance." Roughly: moralism assumes that memorials should be only to good people or good causes; universalism holds that memorials should represent or be "for" the whole polity or its (real or supposed) corporate values; and interpretive dominance maintains that, when faced with monuments with reasonable qualifying and disqualifying interpretations, policy should respond to the disqualifying one(s). These assumptions do not settle the debates between removalists and preservationists, but they do make the removalist position easier to defend. Various counter-examples to these assumptions, real and imagined, motivate competing positions I term "sentimentalism," "particularism," and "interpretive independence."