Ekonomické hlasování a odpovědnost vládních stran ve střední Evropě

In: Central European political studies review: CEPSR = Středoevropské politické studie, Band 15, Heft 2–3, S. 77-100

Abstract

The article presents economic voting theory and its application to the study of electoral behaviour in four Central European countries. The theoretical part describes the reward-punishment model of economic voting and its predictions for electoral behaviour in countries with coalition governance and in internationally open economies during the global economic crisis. The analytical part investigates the existence and features of economic voting (as a P-function) in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Hypotheses about the existence of economic voting in these countries, the higher economic accountability of more responsible coalition partners, and the lower level of economic voting under the perceived influence of the EU on the domestic economy are tested using OLS and binary logistic analysis of European Election Study data (2004 and 2009). As the results show, economic voting was only detected in Hungary (2004 and 2009) and Slovakia (2004). The analysis indicates that, in general, almost all Prime ministers' parties bear a greater degree of economic accountability; meanwhile, perceptions of EU economic responsibility had no influence on the popularity of government parties in 2009.