The Principal Agent Model and the European Union

In: Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics

Abstract

"Foreword" -- "About the Editors" -- "Contents" -- "List of Figures" -- "List of Tables" -- "Introduction. Use and Limitations of the Principal–Agent Model in Studying the European Union " -- "1 Introduction" -- "2 The Principal–Agent Model in the EU Studies" -- "2.1 A Short Introduction to the Principal–Agent Model" -- "2.2 Origins and Evolution of the Model in EU Studies" -- "2.3 The Principal–Agent Model as Heuristic Tool and the Question of Assumptions" -- "3 The Contemporary Relevance of the Principal–Agent Model" -- "3.1 Identifying the Challenge: EU Politics as a Web of Non-exclusively Hierarchical Relations with Multiple Actors" -- "3.2 Coping with the Challenge: Three Uses for the Principal–Agent Model" -- "3.2.1 Mapping Principal–Agent Relations" -- "3.2.2 Studying the Politics of Delegation" -- "3.2.3 Studying the Politics of Discretion" -- "4 Aim, Approach and Structure of the Book" -- "References" -- "The Principal–Agent Model, Accountability and Democratic Legitimacy " -- "1 Introduction" -- "2 The Normative Underpinnings of the Principal–Agent Model" -- "2.1 Rousseau: Representative Democracy" -- "2.2 Weber: The Independent Bureaucracy" -- "3 Contemporary Relevance of Principal–Agent Research for Normative Debates" -- "3.1 The Logics of Delegation" -- "3.2 The Principal's Payoff for Holding Agents Accountable" -- "3.3 Complex Webs of Principal–Agent Relationships" -- "4 Conclusion" -- "References" -- "Non-exclusive delegation to the European External Action Service " -- "1 Introduction" -- "2 Theoretical Puzzle: Non-exclusive delegation" -- "3 Empirical Analysis: EU Delegations and External Representation" -- "3.1 The Politics of Delegation" -- "3.2 Challenging the Hierarchy" -- "3.3 Hidden Information and Hidden Action" -- "4 Theoretical Argument" -- "5 Conclusion" -- "References

Other Versions:

Book(electronic)#12017

The Principal Agent Model and the European Union

In: Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics

Delreux, Tom; Adriaensen, Johan

Delreux, Tom; Adriaensen, Johan

Abstract

This book assesses the use and limitations of the principal-agent model in a context of increasingly complex political systems such as the European Union. Whilst a number of conceptual, theoretical and methodological challenges need to be addressed, the authors show that the principal-agent model can still provide deeper insights into a wide range of political phenomena. Through an empirical analysis of multiple principal-agent relations in the EU, covering a variety of policy fields and political actors, the volume refines our theoretical understanding of the politics of delegation and discretion in the EU. It will appeal to scholars in interested in EU politics and policy, public administration and governance, and international organisations. The chapter 'Multiple principals preferences, different types of oversight mechanisms, and agent's discretion in trade negotiations' is published open access under a CC BY 4.0 license via link.springer.com

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