The normative web: an argument for moral realism

Many philosophers hold antirealist views about morality according to which moral facts or truths do not exist. Does this imply that other types of normative facts, such as epistemtic facts, do not exist? This book develops a positive answer to this question

Antirealist views about morality claim that moral facts or truths do not exist. Do these views imply that other types of normative facts, such as epistemic ones, do not exist? The Normative Web develops a positive answer to this question. Terence Cuneo argues that the similarities between moral and epistemic facts provide excellent reason to believe that, if moral facts do not exist, then epistemic facts do not exist. But epistemic facts, it is argued, do exist: to deny theirexistence would commit us to an extreme version of epistemological skepticism. Therefore, Cuneo concludes, moral facts e

Moral realism of a paradigmatic sort -- Defending the parallel -- The parity premise -- Epistemic nihilism -- Epistemic expressivism : traditional views -- Epistemic expressivism : nontraditional views -- Epistemic reductionism -- Three objections to the core argument