Law and governance in postnational Europe: compliance beyond the nation-state

Cover -- Series-title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Tables -- Notes on contributors -- Preface -- 1 Introduction: Law and compliance at different levels -- 1.1 The principal contest -- 1.2 Comparing compliance across levels -- 1.2.1 Compliance -- 1.2.2 Similar regulations at different levels -- 1.3 The causes of and cures for non-compliance beyond the nation-state: Four theoretical perspectives -- 1.3.1 Cheating and rational institutionalism -- 1.3.2 Ambiguity and legalization -- 1.3.3 Non-acceptance of rules and legitimacy -- 1.3.4 Resources and management -- 1.4 Empirical and normative results -- 1.4.1 The principal contest who is right? -- 1.4.2 What accounts for compliance beyond the nation-state? -- 1.4.3 Is law beyond the nation-state a valid normative project? -- 1.4.4 How to promote law beyond the nation-state? -- 1.4.5 What is special about the EU? -- 2 The analysis of compliance with international rules: Definitions, variables, and methodology -- 2.1 Introduction: Cross-level comparison -- 2.2 Conceptualizing compliance the dependent variable -- 2.2.1 Non-compliance as the difference between facts and norms -- 2.2.2 Compliance as a process -- 2.3 Conceptualizing the independent variables -- 2.3.1 Rational institutionalism -- 2.3.2 Legalization -- 2.3.3 Legitimacy -- 2.3.4 Management -- 2.4 Perspectives, variables, hypotheses, and values -- 3 State aid control at the national, European, and international level -- 3.1 State aid control regulations and the cases of dispute settlement -- 3.1.1 State aid control at the national level: The co-operation between the German L228;nder -- 3.1.2 State aid control at the European level: The EC Treaty provisions on subsidies control -- 3.1.3 State aid control at the international level: The WTO/GATT provisions on subsidies -- 3.2 The degrees of compliance with the state aid control regulations -- 3.2.1 Compliance with the inter-L228;nder codices in Germany -- 3.2.2 Compliance with the European Regulation -- 3.2.3 Compliance with the WTO/GATT Regulations -- 3.2.4 Comparing the degrees of compliance with state aid rules at the different political levels -- 3.3 The independent variables: Explaining the comparative empirical result -- 3.3.1 Rational institutionalism -- 3.3.2 The legalization approach -- 3.3.3 The legitimacy approach -- 3.3.4 The management approach -- 3.4 Conclusion: Comparing compliance with state aid control regimes at three political levels -- 3.4.1 Summary of the performances of the different theoretical perspectives -- 3.4.2 The compliance perspective: What is so special about European politics? -- 4 Domestic limits of supranational law: Comparing compliance with European and international foodstuffs regulations -- 4.1 Risk regulation in the EU and the WTO -- 4.2 Basic trade rules in the EU and WTO -- 4.3 Compliance with European and WTO rules -- 4.4 Dealing with non-compliance -- 4.4.1 Initial non-compliance in the BSE case -- 4.4.2 Permanent compliance crises in the beef hormones case -- 4.5 Explaining compliance -- 4.5.1 Rational institutionalism -- 4.5.2 Legalization -- 4.5.3 Legitimacy -- 4.5.4 Reflexivity -- 4.6 Explaining non-compliance -- 5 Politics of intergovernmental redistribution: Comparing compliance with European and federal redistributive regulations -- 5.1 Intergovernmental redistribution -- 5.2 Intergovernmental redistribution in the EU and Germany -- 5.2.1 Quantita.

This 2005 book argues that Europeanization and globalization have led to ever-more intensive legalization at transnational level. What accounts for compliance beyond the nation-state? The authors tackle this question by comparing compliance with regulations that have been formulated in a very similar way at different levels of governance. They test compliance with rules at the national level, at the regional level (EU), and at a global level (WTO), finding that in fact the EU has higher levels of compliance than both international and national rules. The authors argue that this is because the EU has a higher level of legalization, combined with effective monitoring mechanisms and sanctions. In this respect it seems that the European Union has indeed achieved a high level of legalization and compliance, though the authors add that this achievement does not settle the related queries with the legitimacy of transnational governance and law

What accounts for compliance beyond the nation-state? Comparing compliance with regulations that have been formulated in a very similar way at different levels of governance, the authors demonstrate that verification and sanctioning systems seem to be more important than the presence of an agent that is able to enforce rules

This 2005 book argues that Europeanization and globalization have led to ever-more intensive legalization at transnational level. What accounts for compliance beyond the nation-state? The authors tackle this question by comparing compliance with regulations that have been formulated in a very similar way at different levels of governance. They test compliance with rules at the national level, at the regional level (EU), and at a global level (WTO), finding that in fact the EU has higher levels of compliance than both international and national rules. The authors argue that this is because the EU has a higher level of legalization, combined with effective monitoring mechanisms and sanctions. In this respect it seems that the European Union has indeed achieved a high level of legalization and compliance, though the authors add that this achievement does not settle the related queries with the legitimacy of transnational governance and law