Economic Growth and Endogenous Authoritarian Institutions in Post-Reform China

In: Politics and Development of Contemporary China Ser.

Abstract

Intro -- Acknowledgments -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- 1.1 The Puzzle -- 1.2 Previewing the Argument -- 1.2.1 Dictator's Growth Curse -- 1.2.2 Taming the Curse: Authoritarian Institutional Change -- 1.3 Plan of the Book -- Bibliography -- Part I: A Theory of Authoritarian Institutional Change -- Chapter 2: Why? A Dynamic Theory of Power and Plenty under Dictatorships -- 2.1 Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? Self-enforcing Nature of Authoritarian Institutions -- 2.2 Introducing Dynamic Inconsistency -- 2.3 Authoritarian Weighted Voting and Dictator's Growth Curse -- 2.4 Concluding Remarks -- Appendix: Derivations -- Deriving Time-Separable Payoffs -- Bibliography -- Chapter 3: How? The Dictator's Divide-and-Rule Strategy -- 3.1 (Un)committable Divide-and-Rule Strategy -- 3.1.1 Benchmark -- 3.1.1.1 Elite's First Best Effort -- 3.1.1.2 Elite's Problem -- 3.1.1.3 Elite's Participation Constraint -- 3.1.1.4 Dictator's Contract Design -- 3.1.2 Pure Explicit Scheme: -- 3.1.3 Pure Implicit Scheme: -- 3.1.4 Commitment Problem and Choice between Explicit and Implicit Schemes -- 3.1.4.1 Commitment Constraint -- Stage: Reneging Constraint -- Stage: Effort -- Stage: Scheme Design -- 3.1.4.2 Commitment Problem and Political Discounting -- 3.1.4.3 Full Commitment Ability () -- 3.1.4.4 When the Commitment Constraint Binds () -- 3.2 Taming the Curse -- 3.3 Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Part II: The Era of Institutionalized Authoritarian Rule and Dictator's Growth Curse: A Case Study on China's Trade Policymaking -- Chapter 4: Authoritarian Institutions, China Style -- 4.1 Two Perceptions of China -- 4.2 Reciprocal Accountability and China's Authoritarian Institutions -- 4.3 Incentive Structure I: Bureaucrats -- 4.3.1 Career Path for China's Political Elite in China's Political Pyramid.

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Economic growth and endogenous authoritarian institutions in post-reform China

In: Politics and development of contemporary China

Tung, Hans H.

Tung, Hans H.

Abstract

This book analyzes the dynamic political economy of authoritarian institutions in China and attempts to answer the following questions: What is the significance of China's authoritarian institutions and the changes Xi Jinping has brought to them? Why did the Chinese elites go along with the changes that affected them negatively? Through these questions, the author unravels the mechanics of authoritarian resilience as well as its dynamics. The work reviews both literatures on China studies and comparative authoritarianism to introduce a general framework for analyzing authoritarian institutional change under dictatorships. Hans H. Tung is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and Research Associate of the Center for Research in Econometric Theory and Applications at National Taiwan University, Taiwan

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