Game theory and society

Individual rationality and social optimum -- The Nash equilibrium and the Prisoners' dilemma game -- Multiple equilibriums, institutions, and cultures -- Threats and commitments -- Bargaining and patience -- Repeated games and cooperative behavior -- Incomplete information and reputation -- Adverse selection, brands, and regulation -- Signaling and social norms -- Mechanism design and income distribution -- Moral hazard and corruption -- Evolutionary games and the spontaneous order -- Laws and social norms -- Institutional entrepreneurs and the rules of the game.

Individual rationality and social optimum -- The Nash equilibrium and the Prisoners' dilemma game -- Multiple equilibriums, institutions, and cultures -- Threats and commitments -- Bargaining and patience -- Repeated games and cooperative behavior -- Incomplete information and reputation -- Adverse selection, brands, and regulation -- Signaling and social norms -- Mechanism design and income distribution -- Moral hazard and corruption -- Evolutionary games and the spontaneous order -- Laws and social norms -- Institutional entrepreneurs and the rules of the game

Individual rationality and social optimum -- The Nash equilibrium and the Prisoners' dilemma game -- Multiple equilibriums, institutions, and cultures -- Threats and commitments -- Bargaining and patience -- Repeated games and cooperative behavior -- Incomplete information and reputation -- Adverse selection, brands, and regulation -- Signaling and social norms -- Mechanism design and income distribution -- Moral hazard and corruption -- Evolutionary games and the spontaneous order -- Laws and social norms -- Institutional entrepreneurs and the rules of the game