Advances in experimental social psychology volume 66

Intro -- Advances in Experimental Social Psychology -- Copyright -- Contents -- Contributors -- Chapter One: Moral inconsistency -- 1. Varieties of moral inconsistency -- 2. Inconsistency among our moral behaviors -- 2.1. Psychological license as a source of moral inconsistency -- 2.1.1. Behavioral history as a source of license -- 2.1.1.1. Moral self-licensing: When doing good frees people to do bad -- 2.1.1.2. Self-serving interpretations of one´s own behavioral history -- 2.1.1.3. Moral self-licensing without ``doing good´´ -- 2.1.1.4. Summary: Behavioral history as a source of license -- 2.1.2. Other people as a source of license -- 2.1.2.1. Individuals: Receiving ``vice advice´´ -- 2.1.2.2. Groups: The licensing effect of entitativity -- 2.1.2.3. Society: License from one-time political events -- 2.1.2.4. Summary: Other people as a source of license -- 2.2. Beyond license: Temptation as a source of moral inconsistency -- 3. Inconsistency among our moral judgments of others´ behavior -- 3.1. Motivation as a source of moral inconsistency -- 3.2. Imagination as a source of moral inconsistency -- 3.2.1. Imagination and moral judgments of dishonesty -- 3.2.2. Imagination and moral judgments of blame -- 3.2.3. Imagination and moral judgments of hypocrisy -- 3.2.4. Summary: Imagination as a source of moral inconsistency -- 3.3. Repetition as a source of moral inconsistency -- 4. Tolerating others´ moral inconsistency -- 4.1. When inconsistency is not so hypocritical -- 4.1.1. Order of practicing and preaching -- 4.1.2. Suffering for misdeeds -- 4.1.3. Ambiguity of wrongdoing -- 4.1.4. Culture -- 4.2. When does inconsistency count as hypocrisy? -- 4.2.1. The false-signaling theory -- 4.2.2. The moral-benefits theory -- 4.3. Summary: Tolerating others´ moral inconsistency -- 5. Discussion -- 5.1. Don´t people hate inconsistency?.

Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Volume 67, the latest release in this ongoing series, provides defining pieces of established research programs, reviewing and integrating thematically related findings by individual scholars or research groups. Topics discussed in new volume include The Needs-based Model of Reconciliation: How Identity Restoration Processes Can Contribute to More Harmonious and Equal Social Relations, Moral Inconsistency, A Framework for Understanding Reasoning Errors: From Fake News to Climate Change and Beyond, Affect Contagion: Physiologic Covariation and Linkage Offer Insight into Socially Shared Experiences, and The Impact of Threats to Belonging on Health, Peripheral Physiology, and Social Behavior

Intro -- Advances in Experimental Social Psychology -- Copyright -- Contents -- Contributors -- Chapter One: The intergroup perspective on cross-group friendship -- 1. Intergroup interactions as the substance of cross-group friendship and intergroup contact -- 2. Intergroup contact -- 2.1. The linear model of intergroup contact -- 2.2. The asymptotic model of intergroup contact -- 2.2.1. Intergroup contact can worsen prejudice -- 2.2.2. Implications of the asymptotic model -- 2.3. How do the processes of intergroup contact change with the environment? -- 2.4. Intergroup contact can only take us so far -- 3. Cross-group friendship -- 3.1. Cross-group friendships are emergent processes of repeated intergroup interactions -- 3.1.1. Where do cross-group friendships and intergroup interactions reside psychologically? -- 3.1.2. Dyadic and group friendships -- 3.2. Implications of emergence -- 3.3. Cross-group friendships show sensitivity to initial conditions -- 3.4. Cross-group friendships are self-organizing -- 3.4.1. Initial interactions: Physiological processes related to affiliation -- 3.4.1.1. Stress and social interactions -- 3.4.1.2. Physiological synchrony -- 3.4.2. Intermediate interactions: Threats to stability -- 3.4.3. Established friendship interactions: Maintenance processes -- 4. Why study cross-group friendship from the perspective of intergroup relations? -- References -- Chapter Two: Construal of power as opportunity or responsibility -- 1. What does it mean to construe power as opportunity or responsibility? -- 2. Construing power differently alters powerholders behavior -- 2.1. A selective view on standard approaches to power: Power fosters goal striving -- 2.2. How construal of (high) power may affect the outcomes of power -- 2.3. Decision-making: Construal alters powerholders risk-taking.

Intro -- Advances in Experimental Social Psychology -- Copyright -- Contents -- Contributors -- Chapter One: Confronting intergroup biases: Validity and impugnment as determinants of other-confrontation consequences -- 1. Self-confrontation -- 1.1. Prejudice-related discrepancies -- 1.2. Standard standpoint and affective reactions to prejudice-related discrepancies -- 1.3. The self-regulation of prejudiced responses -- 2. Other-confrontation -- 2.1. Development of other-confrontation research and current focus -- 2.2. Perceiving other-confrontation -- 2.3. The benefits of other-confrontation -- 3. A theoretical framework: Validity and impugnment as determinants of other-confrontation consequences (VIDOCC) -- 3.1. Perceived validity of the confrontation and bias reduction -- 3.1.1. Evidence that other-confrontation causes bias reduction -- 3.2. Is the confronter trying to impugn my egalitarian and non-prejudiced image? -- 3.2.1. Evidence that other-confrontation causes social costs -- 3.3. Do bias reduction and social costs occur independently? -- 4. Moderators of the effect of confrontation on bias reduction -- 4.1. Type of bias -- 4.2. Confronter identity -- 4.3. Confrontation styles -- 5. Moderators of the effect of confrontation on social costs -- 5.1. Type of bias -- 5.2. Confronter identity -- 5.3. Confrontation language -- 5.4. Affirming the confrontee´s self-concept -- 5.5. Confronter-confrontee´s preexisting relationship -- 6. Future directions -- 7. Conclusion -- References -- Chapter Two: How neurons, norms, and institutions shape group cooperation -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Value-based decision-making -- 3. How psychologists study cooperation -- 4. Dual-process vs value-based models of cooperation -- 4.1. Self-control and the dlPFC in cooperation -- 5. Cognitive processes -- 5.1. Representing other minds -- 5.2. Attention -- 5.3. Memory.

Intro -- Advances in Experimental Social Psychology -- Copyright -- Contents -- Contributors -- Chapter One: The relational logic of moral inference -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Background -- 2.1. Morality dominates person perception -- 2.2. Moral impression updating and the negativity bias -- 2.3. Cooperation and forgiveness in an uncertain world -- 2.4. Reconsidering the negativity bias -- 2.5. Summary -- 3. Computational principles of moral inference -- 3.1. Bayesian models of learning and inference -- 3.2. Investigating the computational mechanisms of moral inference -- 3.3. Beliefs about ``bad´´ agents are more uncertain and volatile than beliefs about ``good´´ agents -- 3.4. Moral inference and exposure to community violence -- 3.5. Moral inference in borderline personality disorder -- 3.6. Summary -- 4. Moral inference from moral principles -- 4.1. Moral inference from instrumental harm -- 4.2. Moral inference from impartial beneficence -- 4.3. Moral inference from moral principles is relationship-specific -- 4.4. Summary -- 5. Moral inference from ``non-moral´´ information -- 5.1. Moral inference from decisions about time -- 5.2. Moral inference from decisions about effort -- 5.3. Moral inference from decisions about ambiguity and risk -- 5.4. Moral inference from epistemic behaviors -- 5.5. Summary -- 6. Conclusions and future directions -- Acknowledgment -- References -- Chapter Two: Causes and consequences of coalitional cognition -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Causes -- 2.1. Moving away from categories toward coalitions -- 2.2. Inter-collective functional relations as cues to coalitions -- 2.3. Addressing some challenges for models of coalitional cognition -- 2.4. New insights from a coalitional perspective: Social group reference dependence -- 3. Consequences -- 3.1. Social preferences and values -- 3.2. Emotions.

Intro -- Advances in Experimental Social Psychology -- Copyright -- Contents -- Contributors -- Chapter One: Social evaluation: Comparing models across interpersonal, intragroup, intergroup, several-group, and many-gr ... -- 1. Social evaluation is context-dependent and complex: An illustration -- 2. Joining forces to better understand how people navigate their social environment -- 3. A systematic comparison of five models of social evaluation -- 3.1. Interpersonal evaluation: Dual perspective model (DPM) -- 3.1.1. Theoretical roots -- 3.1.2. Focal domains -- 3.1.3. Premises and evidence -- 3.1.3.1. Priority of communion -- 3.1.3.2. Perspective determines dimension relevance -- 3.1.3.3. Power and interdependence moderate the importance of others agency -- 3.1.3.4. Distinguishing facets of agency and communion helps to refine the predictions -- 3.2. Intragroup evaluation: The behavior regulation model (BRM) -- 3.2.1. Theoretical roots -- 3.2.2. Focal domains -- 3.2.3. Main premises -- 3.2.3.1. Sociability differs from morality -- 3.2.3.2. Morality is primary for group pride and identification -- 3.2.3.3. People are more motivated to do what is moral vs competent or sociable -- 3.2.3.4. Behavioral adaptation to moral ingroup norms communicates loyalty and earns respect -- 3.3. Intergroup evaluation: Dimensional compensation model (DCM) -- 3.3.1. Theoretical roots -- 3.3.2. Focal domains, premises, and evidence -- 3.3.2.1. People rate pairs of groups using the two fundamental dimensions in a compensatory manner -- 3.3.2.2. Compensation is unique to the two dimensions -- 3.3.2.3. Group characterizations are context-based but the two fundamental dimensions are not equally malleable -- 3.3.2.4. Boundary conditions: Conflict and absence of status differences preclude compensation.

Intro -- Advances in Experimental SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY -- Copyright -- Contents -- Contributors -- Chapter One: Worldview conflict and prejudice -- 1. Worldview conflict and prejudice -- 2. Comparing the traditional and the worldview conflict perspectives -- 2.1. Traditional hypothesis -- 2.2. Worldview conflict hypothesis -- 2.3. How do we compare these two hypotheses? -- 3. What do we find? -- 3.1. Ideology and prejudice -- 3.1.1. The original studies -- 3.1.2. Other consistent evidence -- 3.1.3. Making precise predictions -- 3.1.4. The multiple dimensions of politics and prejudice -- 3.1.4.1. Multiple dimensions of politics? -- 3.1.4.2. Multiple hypotheses for multiple dimensions -- 3.1.4.3. Testing three dimension-specific hypotheses -- 3.1.5. Party identification and prejudice -- 3.1.6. Religion and prejudice -- 3.2. Personality -- 3.2.1. The Big Five traits -- 3.2.2. Disgust sensitivity -- 3.2.3. Cognitive ability -- 3.2.4. Summary -- 4. Why the disconnect? -- 5. Open questions -- 5.1. Open question #1: What are the key mechanisms? -- 5.1.1. Different attitudes vs. different identities -- 5.1.2. Uncertainty reduction -- 5.2. Open question #2: Will the traditional hypothesis find support with different measures? -- 5.3. Open question #3: How can we reduce worldview conflict? -- 5.4. Open question #4: Is all worldview conflict morally equivalent? -- 5.5. Open question #5: How does worldview conflict fit into broader research on ideological (as)symmetries? -- 6. Conclusion -- Acknowledgments -- References -- Chapter Two: Prosocial spending and buying time: Money as a tool for increasing subjective well-being -- 1. The link between income and happiness -- 2. Buying experiences -- 3. Assessing and improving evidentiary value -- 4. Prosocial spending -- 4.1. The earliest findings -- 4.1.1. Are the benefits of prosocial spending universal?.