Comparative constitutional design

Introduction / Tom Ginsburg -- Clearing and strengthening the channels of constitution-making / Jon Elster -- What we know nd don't know about design processes / Justin Blount, Zachary Elkins, and Tom Ginsburg -- Democratization and countermajoritarian institutions : the role of power and constitutional design in self-enforcing democracy / Susan Alberts, Chris Warshaw, and Barry R. Weingast -- The origins of parliamentary responsibility / Adam Przeworski, Tamar Asadurian, and Anjali Thomas Bohlken -- The social foundations of China's living constitution / Randall Peerenboom -- The political economy of constitutionalism in a post-secular world / Ran Hirschl -- Designing constitutional amendment rules, to scale / Rosalind Dixon and Richard Holden -- Federalism : general welfare, interstate commerce, and economic analysis / Robert D. Cooter and Neil Seigel -- Personal laws and equality : the case of India / Martha Nussbaum -- Constitutional adjudication, Italian style / John Ferejohn and Pasquale Pasquino -- Tyrannophobia / Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermuele -- Do executive term limits cause constitutional crises? / Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins, and James Melton.

This volume brings together essays by many of the leading scholars of comparative constitutional design from many perspectives to collectively assess what we know - and do not know - about the design process as well as particular institutional choices concerning executive power, constitutional amendment processes and many other issues. Bringing together positive and normative analysis, this volume provides state of the art in a field of growing theoretical and practical importance