Taking rights seriously

Intro -- Title page -- Copyright page -- Contents -- Introduction -- 1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- Chapter 1 Jurisprudence -- Chapter 2 The Model of Rules I -- Embarrassing questions -- Positivism -- Rules, principles, and policies -- Principles and the concept of law -- Discretion -- The rule of recognition -- Notes -- Chapter 3 The Model of Rules II -- Social rules -- Do I really disagree with Hart? -- Does 'institutional support' constitute a rule of recognition? -- Do judges have to have discretion? -- Are rules really different from principles? -- Notes -- Chapter 4 Hard Cases -- Introduction -- The rights thesis -- Rights and goals -- Institutional rights -- Legal rights -- Political objections -- Notes -- Chapter 5 Constitutional Cases -- 1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- Notes -- Chapter 6 Justice and Rights -- 2 -- Notes -- Chapter 7 Taking Rights Seriously -- The rights of citizens -- Rights and the right to break the law -- Controversial rights -- Why take rights seriously? -- Notes -- Chapter 8 Civil Disobedience -- Note -- Chapter 9 Reverse Discrimination -- 1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- Notes -- Chapter 10 Liberty and Moralism -- Lord Devlin's disenchantment -- The first argument: Society's right to protect itself -- The second argument: Society's right to follow its own lights -- The concept of a moral position -- Lord Devlin's morality -- Postscript on pornography -- Notes -- Chapter 11 Liberty and Liberalism -- Chapter 12 What Rights Do We Have? -- No right to liberty -- The right to liberties -- Notes -- Chapter 13 Can Rights be Controversial? -- 1 -- 2 -- 3 -- Notes -- Appendix: A Reply to Critics1 -- Hart and a good night's sleep -- Greenawalt and the rights thesis -- Munzer and no right answer -- Richards and positivism revived -- Soper and positivism redefined -- Nickel and myopia -- Mackie and playing fast and loose

A landmark work of political and legal philosophy, Ronald Dworkin's Taking Rights Seriously was acclaimed as a major work on its first publication in 1977 and remains profoundly influential in the 21st century. A forceful statement of liberal principles - championing the legal, moral and political rights of the individual against the state - Dworkin demolishes prevailing utilitarian and legal-positivist approaches to jurisprudence. Developing his own theory of adjudication, he applies this to controversial public issues, from civil disobedience to positive discrimination. Elegantly written and