Formal models of domestic politics

Formal Models of Domestic Politics offers a unified and accessible approach to canonical and important new models of politics. Intended for political science and economics students who have already taken a course in game theory, this new edition retains the widely appreciated pedagogic approach of the first edition. Coverage has been expanded to include a new chapter on nondemocracy; new material on valance and issue ownership, dynamic veto and legislative bargaining, delegation to leaders by imperfectly informed politicians, and voter competence; and numerous additional exercises. Political economists, comparativists, and Americanists will all find models in the text central to their research interests. This leading graduate textbook assumes no mathematical knowledge beyond basic calculus, with an emphasis placed on clarity of presentation. Political scientists will appreciate the simplification of economic environments to focus on the political logic of models; economists will discover many important models published outside of their discipline; and both instructors and students will value the classroom-tested exercises. This is a vital update to a classic text.

"Scott Gehlbach is Professor of Political Science, Lyons Family Faculty Fellow, and Romnes Faculty Fellow at the University of Wisconsin-Madison; Senior Research Fellow at the International Center for the Study of Institutions and Development at the Higher School of Economics, Moscow; and Research Associate of the Centre for Economic and Financial Research at the New Economic School in Moscow. A specialist in Russia, Professor Gehlbach has made fundamental contributions to the study of economic reform, authoritarianism, and accountability in organizations and government. Known for employing a wide range of research methods in his work, Gehlbach is the author of the award-winning Representation through Taxation: Revenue, Politics, and Development in Postcommunist States (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics) and numerous articles in top journals, including the American Political Science Review, the American Journal of Political Science, and The Journal of Politics. His work has been supported by two Fulbright-Hays Fellowships and many other grants. Professor Gehlbach received his PhD in political science and economics from the University of California, Berkeley"--

Formal Models of Domestic Politics offers the first unified and accessible treatment of canonical and important new formal models of domestic politics. Intended for students in political science and economics who have already taken a course in game theory, the text covers eight classes of models: electoral competition under certainty and uncertainty, special interest politics, veto players, delegation, coalitions, political agency and regime change. Political economists, comparativists and Americanists alike will find models here central to their research interests. The text assumes no mathematical knowledge beyond basic calculus, with an emphasis placed on clarity of presentation. Political scientists will appreciate the simplification of economic environments to focus on the political logic of models; economists will discover many important models of politics published outside of their discipline; and both instructors and students will value the numerous classroom-tested exercises