During the Cold War, the political leadership of the Soviet Union avidly sought intelligence about its main adversary, the United States. Although effective on an operational level, Soviet leaders and their intelligence chiefs fell short when it came to analyzing intelligence. Soviet leaders were often not receptive to intelligence that conflicted with their existing beliefs, and analysts were reluctant to put forward assessments that challenged ideological orthodoxy. There were, however, important changes over time. Ultimately the views of an enlightened Soviet leader, Gorbachev, trumped the
In: Ebrary Online
The United States was seen by Soviet political leaders as the "Main Adversary" throughout the Cold War, and Soviet intelligence services were renowned and feared throughout the world for their ability to conduct espionage and dirty tricks. This work by Raymond Garthoff examines the Soviet foreign intelligence system broadly to evaluate how Soviet leaders and their intelligence chiefs understood, or misunderstood, the United States. This extended case study shows a paradox in the Soviet foreign intelligence system, that as good and feared as Soviet intelligence was at operations, their analysis of intelligence was mediocre and under-resourced. Furthermore, Soviet leaders were more frequently guided by their personal views and Party ideology than by intelligence. This work synthesizes new and old sources on Soviet intelligence and Soviet political leaders to give the most authoritative assessment to date of the Soviet's understanding of the United States. This work is an important case study for the history of intelligence analysis, and it is also an important corrective for those who see Soviet intelligence as an all-powerful and all-knowing force during the Cold War
The United States was seen by Soviet political leaders as the "Main Adversary" throughout the Cold War, and Soviet intelligence services were renowned and feared throughout the world for their ability to conduct espionage and dirty tricks. This work by Raymond Garthoff examines the Soviet foreign intelligence system broadly to evaluate how Soviet leaders and their intelligence chiefs understood, or misunderstood, the United States. This extended case study shows a paradox in the Soviet foreign intelligence system, that as good and feared as Soviet intelligence was at operations, their analysis of intelligence was mediocre and under-resourced. Furthermore, Soviet leaders were more frequently guided by their personal views and Party ideology than by intelligence. This work synthesizes new and old sources on Soviet intelligence and Soviet political leaders to give the most authoritative assessment to date of the Soviet's understanding of the United States. This work is an important case study for the history of intelligence analysis, and it is also an important corrective for those who see Soviet intelligence as an all-powerful and all-knowing force during the Cold War.
Problem melden