The nature of legal interpretation: what jurists can learn about legal interpretation from linguistics and philosophy

"Language shapes and reflects how we think about the world. It engages and intrigues us. Our everyday use of language is quite effortless--we are all experts on our native tongues. Despite this, issues of language and meaning have long flummoxed the judges on whom we depend for the interpretation of our most fundamental legal texts. Should a judge feel confident in defining common words in the texts without the aid of a linguist? How is the meaning communicated by the text determined? Should the communicative meaning of texts be decisive, or at least influential? ... [Contributors] argue that the meaning of language is crucial to the interpretation of legal texts, such as statutes, constitutions, and contracts. Accordingly ... analysis of language from linguists, philosophers, and legal scholars should influence how courts interpret legal texts."--

Contents -- Introduction / Brian G. Slocum -- Chapter 1. The Contribution of Linguistics to Legal Interpretation / Brian G. Slocum -- Chapter 2. Philosophy of Language, Linguistics, and Possible Lessons about Originalism / Kent Greenawalt -- Chapter 3. Linguistic Knowledge and Legal Interpretation: What Goes Right, What Goes Wrong / Lawrence M. Solan -- Chapter 4. The Continued Relevance of Philosophical Hermeneutics in Legal Thought / Frank S. Ravitch -- Chapter 5. The Strange Fate of Holmes's Normal Speaker of English / Karen Petroski -- Chapter 6. Originalism, Hermeneutics, and the Fixation Thesis / Lawrence B. Solum -- Chapter 7. Getting Over the Originalist Fixation / Francis J. Mootz III -- Chapter 8. Legal Speech and the Elements of Adjudication / Nicholas Allott and Benjamin Shaer -- Chapter 9. Deferentialism, Living Originalism, and the Constitution / Scott Soames -- Chapter 10. Deferentialism and Adjudication / Gideon Rosen -- Response to Chapter Ten: Comments on Rosen / Scott Soames -- Contributors -- List of Cases -- Index