Monetary policy, financial crises, and the macroeconomy: Festschrift for Gerhard Illing

Preface -- Contents -- Monetary Policy, Financial Crises, and the Macroeconomy:Introduction -- 1 Liquidity and Contagion of Financial Crises -- 2 Putting Theory to Work -- 3 Re-conceptualizing Macroeconomics -- References -- Part I Liquidity From a Macroeconomic Perspective -- Balancing Lender of Last Resort Assistance with Avoidance of Moral Hazard -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Meaning of Solvency? -- 3 A Liquidity Problem Is a Solvency Problem -- 4 Lend to the Market, not to an Individual Borrower? -- 5 Limiting Moral Hazard -- 5.1 Treat First Worst -- 5.2 Involve the Other Banks, if Possible -- 5.3 Change the Incentive Structure -- 6 Conclusions -- References -- Optimal Lender of Last Resort Policy in DifferentFinancial Systems -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Related Literature -- 2 The Framework -- 2.1 The Setup -- 2.2 Financial Structure of Firms and Banks -- 2.3 Local Lending Markets and the Time Structure of the Model -- 3 Stability of an Individual Bank -- 4 Equilibrium in the Liquidity Market -- 5 Optimal LOLR-Policy -- 6 Conclusions -- References -- Network Effects and Systemic Risk in the Banking Sector -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Structure and Development of Credit Relationships in the Banking Sector -- 2.1 Extracting the ``Stylized Facts'' -- 2.2 Fitting Structural Models: Scale-Free and Core-Periphery Models for the Banking Network -- 2.3 Fitting Behavioral Models: An Actor-Based Approach to Link Formation -- 3 New Structural and Behavioral Models -- 3.1 An Interbank Network Model Based on ``Stylized Facts'' -- 3.2 Interaction Between the Topology of Bank-Firm Loans and the Interbank Network -- 3.3 A Dynamic Model of Link Formation in the Banking Sector -- 4 Conclusion -- References -- Contagion Risk During the Euro Area Sovereign Debt Crisis: Greece, Convertibility Risk, and the ECB as Lender of Last Resort