Dos milagres ou das crenças causais ilegítimas, em David Hume

In: Griot: Revista de Filosofia, Band 20, Heft 2, S. 99-108

Abstract

We will approach here the causal beliefs in miracles from the experimental method used by Hume in order to know if such beliefs can be said legitimate or not. In this way we will have two possibilities: either the criteria used to judge causal beliefs confirm the legitimacy of miracles, and then we will have to assume that such criteria are too flawed to account for the nature of miracles - since they are contrary to experience. Or, then, the criteria used to judge causal beliefs will not allow us to confer a status of legitimacy on miracles, and so we will have a reasonable basis for judging legitimate causal beliefs. We will defend from Hume's texts the second hypothesis with the following argument: a belief to be called legitimate must have the status of proof, the belief in miracle can never be a proof, so the belief in miracle can never be called legitimate.