POLICY FAILURE AND POLITICAL SURVIVAL

In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 43, Heft 2, S. 147-161

Abstract

THE AUTHORS ADVANCE A THEORY OF THE EFFECTS OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS ON STATE POLICY. THE THEORY EXPLAINS HOW POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AFFECT THE ABILITY OF LEADERS TO MAINTAIN THEMSELVES IN OFFICE, WHY SOME POLITICAL SYSTEMS ARE MORE PRONE TO POLICY FAILURE THAN OTHERS, AND WHY AUTOCRATS CREATE MASS POLITICAL SYSTEMS. THE STATISTICAL TESTS DEMONSTRATE THAT (1) LARGE WINNING COALITIONS ARE ASSOCIATED WITH ENHANCED ECONOMIC GROWTH, (2) TENURE IS SHORTENED BY A LARGE WINNING COALITION BUT LENGTHENED BY A LARGE SELECTORATE, AND (3) IN THE FACE OF POLICY FAILURE, LEADERS WITH A LARGE SELECTORATE ARE MORE LIKELY TO SURVIVE THAN THOSE IN SYSTEMS WITH A LARGE WINNING COALITION.