Mot en minikonstitution for EU: Forandring av Ministerradet
In: Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift, Band 109, Heft 3, S. 214-239
Abstract
The theory of social choice has recently benefited much from advances within the power index approach in game theory. One may start from the classical Wicksell framework of a unanimity regime & proceed to state the advantages of deviations from his model. A case can be stated for quantitative voting using some majority voting scheme, as it empowers the choice participants, also providing for blocking power. The power distinctions generated from the power index framework may be applied to the institutional evolution of the Council of Ministers with the EC or EU. It allows one to state in a concise manner the comparative advantages & disadvantages of alternative regimes for the European Community or Union. Tables, Figures, Appendixes, References. Adapted from the source document.
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Sprachen
Schwedisch
Verlag
Fahlbeckska Stiftelsen, Box 52, 22100 Lund, Sweden
ISSN: 0039-0747
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