LEADING WITH THE CHIN: USING SVECHIN TO ANALYZE THE SOVIET INCURSION INTO AFGHANISTAN, 1979-1989

In: The journal of Slavic military studies, Band 8, Heft 2, S. 415-431

Abstract

MAJOR GENERAL ALEKSANDR A. SVECHIN WAS BOTH AN EXPERIENCED SOLDIER AND A WELL-READ SCHOLAR. HIS 1927 WORK ON MILITARY STRATEGY, "STRATEGIA," ANTICIPATED FEATURES OF TWENTIETH CENTURY WARFARE AND IT IS STILL A VALUABLE GUIDE FOR ASSESSING AND PLANNING MILITARY ACTIONS. THIS ARTICLE LOOKS AT WAR THROUGH SVECHIN'S LENS AND EXAMINES THE AFGHANISTAN QUAGMIRE. IT EXPLORES THE IMPORTANCE OF THE STRATEGIC GOAL AND STRATEGY. IT ARGUES THAT THE SOVIET MILIITARY FAILED TO REALIZE ITS GOAL IN AFGHANISTAN.