Dictadores, instituciones y derechos de propiedad

In: Foro internacional: revista trimestral, Band 45, Heft 2, S. 220-248

Abstract

This paper discusses the circumstances & incentives that lead some dictators to create or maintain judicial institutions in their regimes. A game theory model is thus developed with partial data in which it is assumed that dictators are agents seeking to maximize revenues by means of taxes. The model reveals that there are two key factors accounting for the creation of parliaments: a greater share of mobile capital in the economy & a dictator with a high discount factor. They both increase the likelihood of creating such an institution. There are two other implications resulting from the model & which are confirmed in the empirical part: dictatorships with parliaments levy lesser tax rates & increase investment levels. 5 Tables, 1 Figure, 2 Appendixes. Adapted from the source document.