Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem

In: The journal of political philosophy, Band 9, Heft 3, S. 277-306

Abstract

Differences between epistemic & procedural approaches toward democracy are studied to determine whether proceduralist notions of democracy pose epistemic difficulties for existing social decision rules. An overview of the different forms of epistemic & procedural perspectives toward democracy is presented. After reviewing the Marquis de Condorcet's (1785) understanding of the jury system, the question of whether certain social decision rules are better at tracking truths than others is examined. Several hypothetical cases of plurality voting that involve different numbers of voting options are subsequently analyzed. The analysis revealed that all systems of social decision rules were epistemically sound; moreover, all systems were identified as possessing epistemic value, especially when voters demonstrated reliability in selecting the correct outcome & when the electorate itself is large. It is concluded that both epistemic & procedural forms of democracy possess epistemic merit. 4 Tables, 3 Appendixes, 59 References. J. W. Parker