Voting Behavior, Efficiency, and Equity

In: Public choice, Band 21, S. 1-14

Abstract

Accepted theories of public expenditure & collective choice have implicitly assumed that such goods are available solely through public provision. In actual fact, private supply frequently affords the consumer a feasible supplement or substitute, depending on the type of good, which may alter his consumption of public goods or replace it entirely. In the latter case, it has been shown here that the introduction of private supply may exert a marked effect upon the vote. A combination of tax structure & collective-choice mechanism which yields an efficient level of public output in the absence of private supply will, in all probability, not remain optimal when private supply is permitted; indeed, an efficient combination would be most difficult to specify. The impact of private supply upon the distribution of income may in many cases be significant enough to render the notion of tax progressivity meaningless. 2 Figures. AA.