Beneficial Constraints: Beneficial for Whom?

In: Socio-economic review, Band 2, Heft 3, S. 407-414

Abstract

Wolfgang Streeck convincingly argues, in an influential paper published in 1997, that economic performance in market societies is enhanced when the rational, voluntaristic choices of actors are constrained by a variety of normative & institutional constraints. This paper offers three modifications of this central Durkheimian thesis: (1) the meaning of "good performance" of an economic system differs among class actors in a market economy; (2) the level of institutional constraint that is optimal for "good economic performance" in the interests of capitalists is generally lower than the level of constraints that is optimal for workers; & (3) institutional constraints on voluntary rational choice -- even those optimal for capitalists -- also may have dynamic effects on the balance of power among social forces that could lead capitalists to prefer suboptimal constraints from the point of view of "economic performance.". 3 Figures, 2 References. Adapted from the source document.