Random and Systematic Error in Voting in Presidential Elections
In: Political research quarterly: PRQ ; official journal of the Western Political Science Association and other associations, Band 66, Heft 3
Abstract
Condorcet's theory of voting rests on the crucial proposition that voting errors are random and not systematic. Using Lau and Redlawsk's voting correctly measure, I test whether voting error is systematic or random in presidential elections from 1972 to 2004. I show that errors are systematically skewed toward Republican candidates. I also show that the level of skew of incorrect voting has led to the incorrect candidate being elected in three out the last nine elections. In addition, I find that greater skew in Republican campaign spending increases skew of incorrect votes toward Republican candidates. Adapted from the source document.
Themen
Sprachen
Englisch
Verlag
Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks CA
ISSN: 1938-274X
DOI
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