TOCQUELLE'S CAVEAT: CENTRALIZED EXECUTIVE FOREIGN POLICY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

In: Polity: the journal of the Northeastern Political Science Association, Band 22, Heft 3, S. 419-442

Abstract

THE 1987 IRAN-CONTRA HEARINGS REVIVED LONGSTANDING TENSIONS IN AMERICAN POLITICS BETWEEN THE REQUIREMENTS OF DEMOCRACY AND THE DEMANDS OF FOREIGN POLICY MAKING. THIS ARTICLE ASSESSES THE ARGUMENTS MADE IN DEFENSE OF CENTRALIZED DECISION MAKING IN U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND FINDS THEM GENERALLY AT ODDS WITH THE TENETS OF DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL THEORY. THE AUTHOR ARGUES THAT THESE CONTRUDICTIONS SUGGEST THE NEED FOR SIGNIFICANT REFORM IN THE INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENT OF THE NATION'S FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING APPARATUS.