Averting nuclear catastrophe: contemplating extreme responses to U.S. vulnerability
In: The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Band 607, Heft 1, S. 51-58
Abstract
Traditional deterrence is not an effective approach toward terrorist groups bent on causing a nuclear catastrophe. Preventive strategies, which call for the elimination of an enemy before it is able to attack, are highly risky and often difficult to implement. The United States should instead consider a policy of expanded deterrence, which focuses not on the would-be nuclear terrorists but on those states that may deliberately transfer or inadvertently leak nuclear weapons and materials to them. By threatening retaliation against those states, the United States may be able to deter that which it cannot physically prevent.[Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright 2006 The American Academy of Political and Social Science.]
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Englisch
ISSN: 0002-7162
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