Presidents and Cabinets: The Political Determinants of Fiscal Behavior in Latin America

In: Studies in comparative international development, Band 39, Heft 1, S. 3-27

Abstract

What political factors drive fiscal behavior in Latin America's presidential democracies? This work seeks to identify the political determinants of the level of public spending & the primary balance of ten democratic regimes in Latin America between 1980 & 1998. We consider, besides the influence of traditional variables such as the government's ideological orientation & electoral cycle, the impact of other institutional & political aspects, such as the legislative strength of the president, ministerial stability, & the degree of centralization of budget institutions. Methodologically, the work is based on a pooled cross-section -- time-series data analysis of 132 observations. Our main findings are that presidents supported by a strong party & leading a stable team of ministers -- & ones more to the right on the political spectrum -- had a negative impact on public spending & a positive effect on fiscal balance, & that the electoral cycle deteriorates the latter. 4 Tables, 64 References. Adapted from the source document.