The effect of information on oversight: the European Parliament's response to increasing information on comitology decision-making

In: International review of administrative sciences: an international journal of comparative public administration, Band 78, Heft 1, S. 74-92

Abstract

The European Parliament, like any parliament, needs information for scrutinizing executive decision-making. But how does it process this information in practice? This article focuses on the European Parliament's increasing grip on 'comitology' decision-making: committees composed of national civil servants, producing executive measures that are adopted by the European Commission. Two types of changes are addressed: organizational changes and changes in working methods of EP staff. The analysis shows that the European Parliament has effectively built up a system of decentralized police-patrol oversight, but not following more information rights as such but rather as a result of its increasing political powers. The article concludes that information only affects the behaviour of the European Parliament in combination with very specific as opposed to quite general or diffuse political rights. Points for practitioners This article traces the effects of information on the functioning of the European Parliament as an accountability forum. It concludes that information only makes a difference when coupled with very specific as opposed to very general or diffuse political rights.