The Effect of State Legislative Term Limits on Voter Turnout

In: State politics & policy quarterly: the official journal of the State Politics and Policy Section of the American Political Science Association, Band 7, Heft 2, S. 187-210

Abstract

Term limits advocates argued that the reform would revitalize the electorate & spur increased voter participation. They suggested two main mechanisms by which term limits would do this: (1) term limits would increase the number of open-seat races, which tend to be more competitive, & the increased competition would inspire more voting, & (2) the removal of entrenched incumbents would inspire more trust & confidence in government, thereby encouraging voter enthusiasm in a more diffuse way, increasing turnout for all races. I evaluate these hypotheses empirically using data from California state legislative races from 1976 to 2004; incorporating a variety of methods, including pooled cross-sectional time-series regression. I find evidence that state legislative term limits not only fail to achieve the reformers' goals, but they, in fact, decrease voter turnout. Tables, References. Adapted from the source document.