Aufsatz(gedruckt)1975
REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
In: American political science review, Band 69, Heft 2, S. 526-542
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Abstract
EVIDENCE FROM EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS CONTRADICTS THE THEORY OF REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY IN THE U.S. HOWEVER, IT MUST BE NOTED THAT REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY ASSUMES FROM THE OUTSET THAT TRADITIONAL EXTERNAL CONTROLS OF PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY ARE INSUFFICIENT TO SECURE RESPONSIBILITY. TO BE EFFECTIVE ANY TYPE OF CONTROL MUST RELY ON ETHICAL CHECKS, AND ON EXTERNAL SANCTIONS.
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ISSN: 0003-0554
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