Max Weber and the Southwest German School: Remarks on the Genesis of the Concept of the Historical Individual

In: International journal of politics, culture and society, Band 1, Heft 1, S. 115-131

Abstract

The impact of the southwest German school on Max Weber's methodological work between 1903 & 1907 has already been well-established. An attempt is made to discern how this came about -- through the books he read, his acquaintances, or more systematic means. It is argued that the influence of the Baden neo-Kantians lies in the immanent requirements of Weber's thought: their philosophy offered a connection between the problem of knowledge of the historical individual, the problem of concept formation, & the theory of value. However, Weber maintained that cultural & ethical values were entirely separate, while the neo-Kantians -- primarily Heinrich Rickert -- supported a doctrine of objective values; the difficulties this posed for Weber's methodology are explored. In Weber and the Southwest German School: The Genesis of the Concept of the Historical Individual, Ahmad Sadri explores these methodological implications further, focusing on Oakes's criticisms of Weber for: (1) adopting Rickert's theory of objective cultural values without acknowledging its incompatability with his other assumptions, (2) misinterpreting Kantian epistemology, & (3) dichotomizing (along with Rickert) value/valuation. In Commentary on Oakes's Paper, Godehard Czernik asks whether the Kantian assumption that the function of human consciousness (or more precisely, the intellect) is to categorize otherwise unorganized sensations is valid, particularly in light of the problems of value relationality & value judgment that Oakes presents. How would these notions be affected if the individual were conceived of as the subject of ongoing historical processes? Differences between Weber's & Rickert's views on these issues are discussed, with focus on their conceptions of the individual, reality, & historical science. In Commentary on Guy Oakes's paper on "Max Weber and the South German Neo-Kantians," Joseph Bensman expresses doubt that Weber failed to fully understand the neo-Kantians, suggesting that he actually chose not to contradict his friends & mentors, downplaying the methodological & epistemological differences between them. The problem of avoiding the value-reliance of social scientific inquiry & establishing objectivity & logic is addressed, & solutions are offered in the concepts of the historical individual & the ideal type. In Remarks on Weber and Rickert, Guy Oakes reiterates his position on the consequences of Rickert's theory of concept formation for Weber's theory of ideal types, & justifies his critique of Rickert's distinction between values & value judgments. It is concluded that Weber's adaptation of neo-Kantian thought extended far beyond epistemological & methodological issues to a basic concern over the nature of cultural reality. 1 Reference. K. Hyatt