Executive Policy-Making Authority and Using Zero-Base Budgeting for Allocating Resources

In: Policy studies journal: an international journal of public policy, Band 7, Heft 3, S. 554-568

Abstract

Presented is an examination of how executive policy-making authority is affected by allocating public resources via zero-base budgeting (ZBB). As an alternative to traditional incremental budgeting, ZBB uses analytical methods to develop decision packages for each discrete activity of an organization & then ranks the packages on a cost/benefit basis. A review of the concept & rationale for ZBB is presented as the basis for a comparison of incremental policy making with scientific policy making. Decisions reached through incremental policy making result from various competing interest groups trying to advance their own political preferences. Scientific policy making entails identification of decision units & their respective objectives. The argument is made that ZBB will result in greater policy-making authority in the hands of management at the expense of legislative agencies & bureaus. Thus, government's responsiveness to interests of individuals & groups will be reduced using ZBB. Modified HA.