NEW PLAYERS IN AN OLD GAME: PARTY STRATEGY IN MULTI-PARTY SYSTEMS

In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Band 24, Heft 2, S. 147-185

Abstract

THIS ARTICLE COMPARES TWO SPATIAL MODELS OF PARTY COMPETITION: (A) THE TRADITIONAL PROXIMITY MODEL AND (B) THE DIRECTIONAL MODEL OF VOTER CHOICE. THE ARTICLE FIRST LAYS OUT THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO MODELS IN MULTI-PARTY SYSTEMS. THE TRADITIONAL PROXIMITY MODEL MAKES NO CLEAR PREDICTION ABOUT THE SPATIAL STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL PARTIES: THE DIRECTIONAL MODEL PREDICTS THAT OPTIMAL PLACEMENT FOR PARTIES WILL BE ALONG THE CIRCUMFERENCE OF A CIRCLE AT A MODERATE DISTANCE FROM THE CENTER. BOTH THEORIES HAVE IMPLICATIONS FOR OVERTIME STRATEGY AND THE SUCCESS OF NEW POLITICAL PARTIES. TRADITIONAL PROXIMITY THEORY EMPHASIZES THE MOVEMENT TOWARD A LOCATION WITH HIGH DENSITY OF VOTERS, WHILE DIRECTIONAL THEORY EMPHASIZES THE IMPORTANCE OF A DISTINCT DIRECTIONAL STRATEGY. THE AUTHORS EXAMINE THE NORWEGIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM FROM 1969-1985 AND THE SWEDISH SYSTEM FROM 1979-1982 AND FIND THE DIRECTIONAL THEORY MORE STRONGLY SUPPORTED.