Ideological Radicalization and Economic Policy in Cuba

In: Studies in comparative international development, Band 5, Heft 10, S. 203-216

Abstract

The hypothesis presented is that the ideological radicalization of the Cuban Revolution (which gained momentum in 1966 & reached a climax in 1968 with the so-called Revolutionary Offensive) has negatively affected economic performance, growth, & popular support. These phenomena may in turn halt or reverse the process of radicalization. Data come from Cuban statistics, legislation, speeches of the political leaders, radio broadcasts, newspapers, & articles in technical journals. Quantification is prevalent in measuring the economic performance while qualitative interpretation is mainly used when evaluating the radicalization process. In trying to predict the feasibility of the Cuban model, comparisons are made with some antecedents such as "War Communism" in the USSR, the "Great Leap Forward" & the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" in China. The hypothesis is tentatively accepted, although additional data & time are necessary to draw more solid conclusions. The radicalization process seems to have induced a decline in sugar production, nonsugar agriculture, & mining (except nickel) output, & GNP in both absolute figures & per capita. Domestically, this has forced an expansion of rationing & mass mobilization for productive activities. Externally it has resulted in a widening deficit in the balance of trade. There are also signs of deterioration in the political consensus. Although the Cuban blueprint for the future society & "New Man" is very appealing to the sociologist, there are serious doubts whether the economic performance of the nation will permit the continuation of the process. Modified AA.