Conservation cartels

In: Regulation: the Cato review of business and government, Band 27, Heft 4, S. 38-45

Abstract

After applying the dilemma illustrated in Garrett Hardin's "The Tragedy of the Commons" to open-access fisheries, which face overfishing, the idea of conservation cartels is discussed. While they have been successful, these cartels are held as uniformly per se illegal arrangements under the Sherman Antitrust Act. Private property is seen as a potential solution, with such regimes manifesting in the form of collective or "common property" rights. However, despite the benefits of such a regime, the most common approach to fishery conservation is government regulation. It is argued that such regulation does little to fend off the tragedy of the commons. Antitrust litigation against marine conservation cartels inhibits the development of nongovernmental cooperative management structures that can address fishery problems. Further, the anticompetitive nature of these cartels does not preclude their working in the interest of the common good.