Article(print)1992

RULES, DISCRETION, AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN MACROECONOMIC POLICYMAKING

In: Governance: an international journal of policy and administration and institutions, Volume 5, Issue 3, p. 259-278

KEECH, W

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Abstract

ARGUMENTS FOR RULES RATHER THAN DISCRETION IN THE MACROECONOMIC POLICYMAKING FACILITATE THE UNDERSTANDING OF SOME FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY. THIS ARTICLE REVIEWS FOUR SUCH ARGUMENTS, AND RELATES THEM TO ISSUES OF DELEGATION AND ACCOUNTABILTIY IN REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT.

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