JUSTIFYING TOLERANCE

In: Canadian journal of political science: CJPS = Revue canadienne de science politique : RCSP, Band 17, Heft 1, S. 3-23

Abstract

ARGUMENTS FOR TOLERANCE, AND CRITICISMS OF IT, REGULARLY PRODUCE PARADOXES AND OTHER KINDS OF CONCEPTUAL DIFFICULTY. SEEK TO SHOW THAT THESE PARADOXES ARE UNNECESSARY, AND THAT THEY ARISE FROM MISCONCEPTIONS OF WHAT A THEORY OF TOLERANCE IS REQUIRED TO JUSTIFY. IMAGINED AS A "VIRTUE," TOLERANCE IS SIMPLY CONFUSED WITH OTHER CONCEPTS; UNDERSTOOD IN THE FRAMEWORK OF A THEORY OF "RIGHTS," THE ELEMENT OF CHOICE ESSENTIAL TO THE CONCEPT IS WHOLLY NEGLECTED; EXPLAINING THE CONCEPT IN TERMS OF SOME THEORY OF FALLIBILISM LEADS TO A CONFUSION OF PRAGMATIC WITH CONGNITIVE STANDARDS. MOREOVER, SUCH MISTAKEN APPROACHES OFTEN ARISE FROM AN EQUATION OF TOLERANCE WITH LIBERALISM OR PLURALISM: THE AUTHORS MAINTAIN, HOWEVER, THAT JUSTIFICATIONS OF TOLERANCE DO NOT REST ON A COMMITMENT TO ANY POLITICAL THEORY OR IDEOLOGY, BUT IMPLY ONLY A RECOGNITION OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION ITSELF.