Popperova filozofija znanosti

In: Filozofski vestnik: FV, Band 16, Heft 1, S. 227-245

Abstract

Karl Popper's distinction between science & metaphysics (pseudoscience) is analyzed, arguing that the principle of demarcation (falsification) cannot support Popper's thesis. Although falsification can be useful for distinguishing between empirical & nonempirical sciences, it also leads to clustering logic & mathematics, theory of induction, metaphysical theories, & philosophy in general. It is argued that Popper misinterprets A. Tarski's (1949) notion of the pursuit of truth in science & assumes that it can meet some objective criteria. One of the major problems of Popper's view of science in his theory of verisimilitude, allegedly capable of solving the problems of correspondence & objectivity. Instead, a blend of Popper's & Feyerabend's positions on scientific progress is suggested. 17 References. Adapted from the source document.