SOLIDARITY, OBJECTIVITY, AND THE HUMAN FORM OF LIFE: WITTGENSTEIN VERSUS RORTY

In: Critical review: an interdisciplinary journal of politics and society, Band 11, Heft 4, S. 555-580

Abstract

REASON, OBJECTIVITY, AND HUMAN NATURE ARE NOW SUSPECT IDEAS. AMONG POSTMODERN THINKERS, RICHARD RORTY HAS ADVANCED AN ESPECIALLY FORCEFUL CRITIQUE OF THESE NOTIONS. DRAWING PARTLY ON WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE, RORTY CONTENDS THAT OBJECTIVITY IS NO MORE THAN A METAPHYSICAL NAME FOR INTERSUBJECTIVE AGREEMENT AND THAT "HUMAN NATURE" IS AN EMPTY CATEGORY, THERE BEING NOTHING BENEATH HISTORY AND CULTURE. HOWEVER, WITTGENSTEIN HIMSELF RECOGNIZED THE WORLD'S MANY CIVILIZATIONS, "THE COMMON BEHAVIOR OF MANKIND," WITHOUT WHICH RORTY'S ETHNOCENTRIC SOLIDARITY WOULD BE INCONCEIVABLE. THIS COMMON FORM OF LIFE -- THE LIFE OF THOSE WHO SPEAK -ENCOMPASSES COUNTLESS HUMAN ACTIVITIES THAT PRESUPPOSE AND ARE INTERWOVEN WITH THE CONCEPTS OF REASON AND OBJECTIVITY.