COMPARING STRATEGIES IN A SPATIAL MODEL OF ELECTORAL COMPETITION

In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 18, Heft 3, S. 501-523

Abstract

A MODEL WHICH ELIMINATES THE RESTRICTION OF THE DAVIS-HINICH SPATIAL MODEL OF MAJORITY RULE IS INTRODUCED WHICH ALLOWS EACH VOTER TO CHOOSE HIS OWN INDIVIDUAL LOSS FUNCTION AS WELL AS HIS PREFERRED POSITION. THE SOPHISTICATED DAVIS-HINICH SPATIAL MODEL OF MAJORITY RULE REQUIRES THAT ALL VOTERS USE A COMMON LOSS FUNCTION IN EVALUATING CANDIDATES. SEVERAL CANDIDATE STRATEGIES, IE, TOTAL MD STRATEGIES & MEAN STRATEGIES ARE DEFINED & COMPARED. THE TOTAL MD STRATEGY DOMINATES BECAUSE IT CANNOT BE BEATEN UNDER MAJORITY RULE. THE MEAN STRATEGY IS THE MOST BENEFICIAL; IT MINIMIZES SOCIETAL LOSS BUT IT IS NOT A DOMINANT CAMPAIGN STRATEGY UNLESS IT COINCIDES WITH THE TOTAL MD STRATEGY. A GENERALIZED TOTAL MD STRATEGY IS DEFINED & SHOWN TO BE DOMINANT UNDER MAJORITY RULE. THE SPATIAL STRATEGY MINIMIZING SOCIETAL LOSS IS DERIVED. THE MEAN STRATEGY DOES NOT MINIMIZE SOCIETAL LOSS & THE TOTAL MD STRATEGY DOES NOT DOMINATE UNDER MAJORITY RULE. WITHOUT THE RESTRICTIVE ASSUMPTION OF A COMMON LOSS FUNCTION, THE STRATEGIES PLAYING A CENTRAL ROLE IN THE DAVIS-HINICH MODEL ARE NOT OPTIMAL. SEVERAL POLITICAL PLATFORMS WERE DEFINED. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PLATFORMS WAS INVESTIGATED THROUGH THEOREMS & EXAMPLES. THE NEW MODEL WAS FOUND TO BE MATHEMATICALLY TRACTABLE. 6 FIGURES. MODIFIED HA.