Protest and Bargaining

In: Journal of peace research, Band 11, Heft 2, S. 133-144

Abstract

Protest in pluralist sectors will take place in a different bargaining framework & produce different consequences from protests in issue areas where the traditional pluralist structure is inoperative. Whether the pluralist bargaining matrix evolves or not is seen as a function of the political culture, the indifference level of the mass public, & the stakes of political allies in settling the dispute. Aggregate data from civil rights protests in 109 Southern counties in the US in 1961 & 1963 are used to support the protest model presented. Sources of data are: (1) materials provided by the Southern Regional Council, (2) the US Commission on Civil Rights, (3) the Potomac Instit, & (4) the INDEX OF THE NEW YORK TIMES & FACTS ON FILE. Change was measured by amount of desegregation. Where blacks were a minority in the county, large demonstrations were more successful than in counties where blacks were in the majority. They were very successful in counties with low racial consciousness (as measured by voting behavior), but failed in communities with high racial consciousness; small demonstrations had about the same degree of success regardless of racial consciousness. High intensity of conflict (high number of participants & arrests) in counties with high racial consciousness scores resulted in less change than in counties with low racial consciousness. The more complex the economy & the more potential allies for the protesters of a city (as measured by the N of large firms), the more large protests will lead to change. In cities with fewer large firms, the size of the demonstration has little effect on change. A consideration of implications for European countries concludes the discussion. 3 Tables. Modified Author's Summary.