ELICITING COLLABORATION FROM RISKY STATES: THE LIMITS OF CONVENTIONAL MULTILATERALISM IN SECURITY AFFAIRS

In: Global society: journal of interdisciplinary international relations, Band 11, Heft 1, S. 93-110

Abstract

THE EMERGENCE OF AN INCREASING NUMBER OF STATES WITH A HIGH CONFLICT PROPENSITY CONSTITUTES A MAJOR CHALLENGE TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY. THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES HOW INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS CAN COUNTER THE THREATS POSED BY RISKY STATES. IT ARGUES THAT LIBERAL APPROACHES UNDERESTIMATE THE ABILITY OF ACTORS EXTERNAL TO AN INSTITUTION TO DISRUPT THE COLLECTIVE ATTEMPTS TO ELICIT CO-OPERATION FROM RISKY STATES. IT OFFERS A MODEL-BASED TYPOLOGY OF MULTILATERAL MECHANISM AND DISCUSSES THE LIMITS OF CURRENT STRATEGIES FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF NON-CO-OPERATIVE GAME THEORY.