Saving Scanlon: Contractualism and Agent-Relativity

In: The journal of political philosophy, Band 9, Heft 4, S. 472-481

Abstract

Two major critiques of M. Scanlon's contractualism are analyzed & dismissed. With respect to the position of the agent who decides about principles of behavior, Scanlon's view is that the reasons that ground reasonable rejection of principles of behavior must necessarily by agent-relative & personal, not agent-neutral & impersonal, as critics imply. In addition, there can be moral & nonmoral reasons for rejection. If only moral notions are acceptable for rejection, then the grounds for rejection would be responsible for the rejection, making the rejection itself (& Scanlon's theory) irrelevant. Scanlon also argues that the most common forms of moral bias occur when other agent-relative complaints are not taken seriously enough. Scanlon's rejection of consequentialism is discussed. M. Pflum