MUNICIPAL REPRESENTATION, EXECUTIVE POWER, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICY ADMINISTRATION

In: Policy studies journal: an international journal of public policy, Volume 15, Issue 2, p. 211-230

Abstract

THROUGHOUT MOST OF THIS CENTURY, PRACTITIONERS AND STUDENTS OF URBAN POLITICS HAVE DEBATED THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS WHICH FALL UNDER THE LABEL OF MUNICIPAL REFORMISM. MORE RECENTLY, IN THE WAKE OF URBAN FISCAL RETRENCHMENT, INDUSTRIAL RELOCATION, AND SUNBELT-FROSTBELT COMPETITION, DEBATE AMONG ACADEMICS AND POLITICAL PRACTITIONERS HAS OFTEN FOCUSED UPON THE CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF VARIOUS KINDS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT POLICIES EMPLOYED BY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. THIS ARTICLE REPRESENTS AN ATTEMPT TO ILLUMINATE DISCUSSION OF THE MORE RECENT CONTROVERSY OVER DEVELOPMENT POLICY THROUGH THE USE OF ARGUMENTS DRAWN FROM THE OLD MUNICIPAL REFORM DEBATE. MORE SPECIFICALLY, THIS PAPER CONTENDS THAT THE EXTENT TO WHICH A CITY ENACTS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICIES AND ITS CHOICE AMONG DIFFERENT POLICIES MAY DEPEND, IN PART, UPON THE PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF PARTICULAR POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AFFECTING REPRESENTATION AND EXECUTIVE POWER.