EXPLAINING INSTITUTIONS: A DEFENSE OF REDUCTIONISM

In: European journal of political research: official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Band 32, Heft 1, S. 51-69

Abstract

IN ONE LINE OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL RESEARCH, SCHOLARS ARGUE THAT THE SOCIAL SCIENCES SHOULD TRANSCEND REDUCTIONIST MODES OF EXPLANATION, IN PARTICULAR THE METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM EXEMPLIFIED BY THE THEORY OF RATIONAL CHOICE. IN THIS VIEW, REDUCTIONISM DOES NOT PERMIT THE ENDOGENOUS TREATMENT OF INSTITUTIONS AND THUS CANNOT ACCOUNT FOR IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT IN WHICH AGENTS ACT. IN THIS PAPER, THE MEANINGS OF THE TERMS "METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM" AND "REDUCTIONISM" ARE DISCUSSED AND ILLUSTRATED BY A DESCRIPTION OF SOME CENTRAL ASSUMPTIONS OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY, ESPECIALLY GAME THEORY. THE CLAIM THAT REDUCTIONISM SHOULD BE TRANSCENDED IS UNWARRANTED; REDUCTIONISM IS PERFECTLY COMPATIBLE WITH THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS. THE VARIOUS INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS THAT HAVE BEEN DISTINGUISHED IN THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL LITERATURE CAN BE SYSTEMATICALLY DESCRIBED IN TERMS OF A GAME-THEORETIC MODEL. FURTHERMORE, THE DYNAMIC MODELS OF GAME THEORY CAN BE USED TO EXPLAIN THE EMERGENCE OF INSTITUTIONS.