PARETO OPTIMALITY OF POLICY PROPOSALS WITH PROBABILISTIC VOTING

In: Public choice, Band 39, S. 427-433

Abstract

THIS PAPER STUDIES THE PARETO OPTIMALITY PROPERTIES OF POLICY PROPOSALS AND ELECTORAL OUTCOMES WHEN THERE IS PROBABILISTIC VOTING. THEOREM 1 PROVES THAT, WHEN THE POSITION OF ONE CANDIDATE IS TAKEN AS FIXED, THE OTHER CANDIDATE WILL PROPOSE A PARETO OPTIMAL ALTERNATIVE. THIS IMPLIES THAT WHENEVER THERE IS AN ELECTORAL EQUILIBRIUM (IN PURE STRATEGIES) THE ELECTORAL OUTCOME IS PARETO OPTIMAL. IT ALSO IMPLIES THAT, EVEN IF THERE IS NO SUCH EQUILIBIRUM, THE ELECTORAL OUTCOMES FROM A SEQUENCE OF ELECTIONS WILL BE PARETO OPTIMAL (EXCEPT, POSSIBLY, FOR AN INITIAL STATUS QUO).