Term Limits' Multiple Effects on State Legislators' Career Decisions

In: State politics & policy quarterly: the official journal of the State Politics and Policy Section of the American Political Science Association, Band 6, Heft 4, S. 357-383

Abstract

Most studies of the effects of term limits on state legislators' careers have focused solely on their propensity to seek other offices. An expected-utility analysis of the decision to run for office indicates that term limits reduce the benefits of seeking reelection, even for state legislators who are eligible to run, & reduce the opportunity cost of running for other offices. From this analysis, I develop a series of hypotheses about the probability that state legislators-term-limited or not-will seek re-election or other offices under a term limits regime, the value of the offices they seek, & the probability with which they will win these contests. I test these hypotheses using data on the career choices of state legislators in states with & without term limits in 2000-02. My empirical analysis supports the rational entry model & indicates that term limits have had a much richer effect on state legislative careers than previously understood. Tables, Figures, References. Adapted from the source document.