Unabhangige Regulierungsinstanzen als parallele Institutionen - Die Auseinandersetzung um die Entbundelungsverpflichtung auf der letzten Meile in der Schweizer Telekommunikationspolitik

In: Swiss political science review: SPSR = Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft = Revue suisse de science politique, Band 11, Heft 4, S. 169-202

Abstract

This article analyzes the impact of the development of independent regulatory agencies (IRA) on the political decision-making process. Relying on the literature on institutional redundancy, this contribution interprets IRA's as institutions parallel to the traditional law-making process. When both the IRA & the institutions of the classic legislative process are competent in a policy domain, reformers are free to choose between the two procedures & they thus still have a second chance after a defeat in a first attempt. On the basis of an empirical example -- the conflict on the unbundling of the local loop -- this article studies the resulting interactions by resorting to a simple game theoretical model. As shown in this contribution, parallel institutions constitute an advantage for reformers provided that both institutions decide independently from each other. If this is not the case, the order of sequences of the parallel procedures is of crucial importance. Given that reformers can choose this order, they benefit from a first-mover advantage. Moreover, on the empirical level, this contribution shows that the existence of several parallel procedures combined with several veto points within this process may lead to ongoing uncertainty about the outcome of the entire reform process. Tables, Graphs, References. Adapted from the source document.