Group strength, accountability and growth under dictatorship

In: International political science review: the journal of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) = Revue internationale de science politique, Band 32, Heft 1, S. 5-22

Abstract

This article tests the hypothesis that group power affects development policy by holding dictators accountable through different mechanisms. New data on dictators' modes of exit for the period 1946-2000 allow us to estimate the predicted likelihood that a given authoritarian head of government will be toppled by the elite, the military or the citizenry. When the predicted odds are used as a measure of group strength, the results of simple growth regressions reveal that a stronger citizen opposition or a greater military threat compels the ruler to improve economic growth rates. In contrast, elite power is negative for growth, although it turns positive when a country reaches a certain level of industrialized development. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright, the International Political Science Association.]